![\"\"](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/farm4.static.flickr.com\/3014\/3052098708_d2d448dd7c.jpg?resize=500%2C262\" "\\"Shanghai\\"")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Gordon G. Chang, for\u00a0World Affairs<\/em>, explains his argument for\u00a0why the Beijing consensus cannot last<\/a> and its power will soon begin to wane. He acknowledges that many do not share this view:<\/p>\n Some scholars and China watchers nonetheless believe that Chinese authoritarianism, in the words of Andrew J. Nathan, may be \u201ca viable regime form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the global economy.\u201d Recent Beijing leaders, Nathan tells us, have institutionalized themselves. \u201cRegime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, over-reliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. This particular authoritarian system, however, has proven resilient.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As many have pointed out, the projections of China’s growth into the world’s largest economy presume it’s current pace of growth continues despite serious environmental, demographic, and other challenges. But, Chang argues, even the regime’s success at creating prosperity undermines it:<\/p>\n Senior Beijing officials now face the dilemma of all reform-minded authoritarians: the economic progress that legitimates their leadership endangers their continued control. As Samuel Huntington taught us, sustained modernization is the enemy of one-party systems. Revolutions occur under many conditions, but especially when political institutions do not keep up with the social forces unleashed by economic change.<\/p>\n Beijing\u2019s policies are widening the gap between the people, who are making a \u201ckinetic dash into the future,\u201d and their government, thereby ensuring greater instability. So it should come as no surprise that as China has grown more prosperous in recent years, it has also become less stable.\u00a0As a people, the Chinese are not particularly obedient these days; they incite as many as 127,000 disturbances a year\u2014perhaps more. Whatever the exact number, the political system is obviously having increasing difficulty channeling discontent as the Chinese people, believing in their rights and fearing their leaders less and less, wrestle for control of their future. As a prominent businessman told me last spring\u2014smiling broadly as he sat in his spacious office in a Shanghai skyscraper\u2014\u201cNo one fears the government anymore.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n If prosperity undermines one-party rule, then the only thing that undermines it more is when rising expectations of more prosperity can no longer be met. And in Chang’s view, China’s leadership made a major miscalculation in basing their economy so heavily on exports:<\/p>\n China\u2019s economic model, which allowed the Chinese to take maximum advantage of boom times, is particularly ill suited to current global conditions [of declining exports].<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Chang concludes:<\/p>\n We may…soon witness in China revolution by spontaneous combustion. Despite his belief that revolutions must be minutely organized, Lenin\u2019s own state was eventually brought down not by a network of plotters but by an impromptu crowd. What we witnessed in Moscow\u2014the disintegration of a state in a matter of days\u2014later replayed itself in Manila, Lima, Belgrade, Kiev, and Tbilisi. Chinese people today may not have revolutionary intentions, yet their acts of protest at this unsettling time have revolutionary implications nonetheless.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This is a similar argument to\u00a0the one made by Yang Yao<\/a> several weeks ago.<\/p>\n