Category: Economics

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Barack Obama Economics Financial Crisis Politics The Opinionsphere

Is This Downturn a Crisis of Confidence or a Fundamental Error?

Prefacing my thoughts on economics, as always, with the warning that I am not an economist, but only an amateur…

My non-professional observation is that when a disproportionate amount of money is controlled by the financial sector, a crash soon follows. This observation isn’t original. As Paul Krugman observed a few days ago in the New York Times:

After 1980, of course, a very different financial system emerged. In the deregulation-minded Reagan era, old-fashioned banking was increasingly replaced by wheeling and dealing on a grand scale. The new system was much bigger than the old regime: On the eve of the current crisis, finance and insurance accounted for 8 percent of G.D.P., more than twice their share in the 1960s. By early last year, the Dow contained five financial companies — giants like A.I.G., Citigroup and Bank of America.

Krugman concludes that this structural issue is at the root of the problem – rather than a liquidity issue with the banks:

I don’t think this is just a financial panic; I believe that it represents the failure of a whole model of banking, of an overgrown financial sector that did more harm than good. I don’t think the Obama administration can bring securitization back to life, and I don’t believe it should try.

Simon Johnson, an economist formerly with the IMF, agrees with Krugman in a long piece in The Atlantic Monthly, and he echoes another point I’ve been making:

Oversize institutions disproportionately influence public policy; the major banks we have today draw much of their power from being too big to fail.

Reading both of these men, I find myself hoping they are wrong while sensing that they are at least partially right. Evan Thomas of Newsweek captured this balance nicely in his cover piece from the current issue:

If you are of the establishment persuasion (and I am), reading Krugman makes you uneasy. You hope he’s wrong, and you sense he’s being a little harsh (especially about Geithner), but you have a creeping feeling that he knows something that others cannot, or will not, see. By definition, establishments believe in propping up the existing order. Members of the ruling class have a vested interest in keeping things pretty much the way they are. Safeguarding the status quo, protecting traditional institutions, can be healthy and useful, stabilizing and reassuring. But sometimes, beneath the pleasant murmur and tinkle of cocktails, the old guard cannot hear the sound of ice cracking.

At the same time as Establishment defenders such as Robert Samuelson are uneasy about the scope of what Obama is proposing, other members of the Establishment are uneasy that he may not be doing enough. We don’t know who is right.

To some extent we can discount Krugman’s opposition due to his personal fantasy of how his life might work out:

Krugman says he found himself in the science fiction of Isaac Asimov, especially the “Foundation” series—”It was nerds saving civilization, quants who had a theory of society, people writing equations on a blackboard, saying, ‘See, unless you follow this formula, the empire will fail and be followed by a thousand years of barbarism’.”

His critique of Obama’s plans seems to follow this model – as his warnings take on more prophetic tones.

But there is real intellectual weight to this theory of the financial crisis as something more than a liquidity or confidence crisis. Krugman outright rejects this explanation:

[T]he banks [are] really, truly messed up: they bet heavily on unrealistic beliefs about housing and consumer debt, and lost those bets. Confidence is low because people have become realistic. [my emphasis]

In other venues, Krugman describes the problems as extending far further than this – as above when he discusses the trend towards increasing the influence of American finance and increasing income disparity. This stands on contrast to the approach of both Hank Paulson and Tim Geithner who believe that the crisis is primarily one of confidence. They are treating the crisis as a more technical and esoteric version of a bank panic solved by a show of strength, as for example, the Panic of 1907:

Shipments of gold were on the way from London to New York, and confidence had returned to the French Bourse, “owing,” reported one paper, “to the belief that the strong men in American finance would succeed in their efforts to check the spirit of the panic.” During a panic, confidence is almost as good as gold.

Today, the government has taken the role of “the strong men in American finance” who are seeking a show of strength to boost confidence.

On the one side, you have economists – from Simon Johnson to Paul Krugman to Nouriel Roubini – who have been predicting doom for some time claiming that there are fundamental problems with our finance industry – and as a result of the size and influence of our finance industry – our entire economy. On the other you have men and women with power – in both finance and government – who are acting as if the problem is mainly one of a lack of confidence and a broken mechanism. 

My bet – based in no small part on my innate optimism as well as a respect for people on both sides of this debate – is that in the short term, the Geithner plans will work to restart the “old” economy. In this moment before that happens though, pressure from Europe and internal critics as well as a desire to avoid a repeat of this fiasco will enable enough forward-looking, gradualist regulation and legislation to correct the long-term problems with high finance.  Already, there are some signs that this is what is happening.

Categories
Economics Financial Crisis The Opinionsphere

Why It’s A Good Sign That Byron Trott Is Leaving Goldman Sachs

[digg-reddit-me]Though the articles about investment bankers leaving the big firms to start up their own smaller, competing firms seem to be trying to suggest that this is a bad thing – I find it hard to see it as anything but good. For example, an article in today’s Wall Street Journal by Heidi N. Moore and Scott Patterson suggests Byron Trott is leaving Goldman Sachs to start his own firm because of caps “on executive pay and calls for tighter regulation” on large banks. Byron Trott is significant because he is Warren Buffett’s favorite investment banker – but the article also suggests he is part of a larger trend. 

This strikes me as an almost unalloyed good. If banks like Golman Sachs, Citibank, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, etcetera are too big – and if the government isn’t going to break them up – then this draining of talent and resources into smaller firms run by highly competent former members of these organizations seems like the next best thing. Hopefully, this will help defuse the centralization of power and money in a few big firms which is one of the major factors that led to this crisis. 

Simon Johnson and others have argued that we need to break up these banks that are too big to fail:

Anything that is too big to fail is too big to exist.

My thought is that this might be accomplished with less political capital and more “naturally” in a market-driven approach that simply imposed regulations and costs on institutions that are “too-big-to-fail” that would serve to drive individuals to set up smaller companies.  At institutions that are too big to fail, there should be, for example, a fee similar to that paid to the FDIC by banks to finance the protection given to them. At the same time, pay – rather than being capped at a particular hard amount – should be forced to be tied to long-term results to avoid drastic short-term risk-taking; I’m sure there are other ways out there to limit pay without imposing caps. And of course, regulations should ensure that an appropriate amount of capital is available to handle any leveraged risks.

Even if this market-driven approach is not sufficient, the steps taken so far are at least moving people in the right direction.

Categories
Criticism Economics Political Philosophy The Opinionsphere

The Government Role in a Capitalist Economy

[digg-reddit-me]Robert J. Samuelson does a pretty good job in his column from last week of illustrating the incoherence of “the Establishment’s view” of government’s role in capitalism.

He begins his article discussing the prescient observations of Joseph Schumpeter, a 20th century economist who predicted that capitalism “sowed the seeds of its own destruction.” He described Schumpeter’s understanding of capitalism:

[Capitalism’s] chief virtue was long-term – the capacity to increase wealth and living standards. But short-term politics would fixate on its flaws – instability, unemployment, inequality. Capitalist prosperity also created an oppositional class of “intellectuals” who would nurture popular discontents and disparage values (self-enrichment, risk-taking) necessary for economic success.

Samuelson observes that Schumpeter’s observations seem to get to the heart of capitalism – yet he says, their conclusion is wrong – because capitalism survived. It survived Samuelson observes because:

We have subordinated unrestrained profit-seeking to other values. “We’ve gradually taken into account the external effects (of business) and brought them under control,” says economist Robert Frank of Cornell University. External costs include: worker injuries from industrial accidents; monopoly power; financial manipulation; pollution.

Samuelson goes on:

Successful capitalism presupposes three conditions: first, the legitimacy of the profit motive – the ability to do well, even fabulously; second, widespread markets that mediate success and failure; and finally, a legal and political system that, aside from establishing property and contractual rights, also creates public acceptance. Note that the last condition modifies the first two, because government can – through taxes, laws and regulations – weaken the profit motive and interfere with markets…

Now we’re really getting somewhere. Capitalism, it seems, must not be a matter of pure natural forces. It is not “unrestrained profit-seeking” in Samuelson’s view – nor does it exclude government intervention, as legal and political structures must modify markets and profit-making in order to “create public acceptance.” That’s a bit of an odd formulation, as anything could be justified as being done in order to “create public acceptance.” Circuses, beheadings, propaganda, war, large-scale confiscation of property – whatever. What Samuelson must mean – although it has to be inferred – is that measures designed to “create public acceptance” can only go so far before the essence of capitalism is destroyed – as he warns is imminently possible in his concluding paragraph. There is only a “thin line” he explains between capitalism and socialism – because:

If companies need to be rescued from “the market,” why shouldn’t Washington permanently run the market? That’s a dangerous mindset.

To illustrate this dangerous mindset which is empowered by an equally dangerous populism, he points to interjections of the government into the economy in the past half-century that have not been for the good – that is, those interjections in which the benefits are concentrated and the costs are dispersed, for example, ethanol subsidies and the promotion of the advantages for politically-connected companies; and those interjections that have scapegoated various groups – such as the anti-bonus tax bill. This implies – if nothing else – a confusion on Samuelson’s part.

Political actions in which the benefits are concentrated and the costs are dispersed are – as George Will put it “the supreme law of the land.” They have been the main business of American government since shortly after it’s founding – from subsidies for railroads to the laws enabling the various cartels of the Gilded Age to the military-industrial complex to agriculture subsidies in general to the bailouts of various industries. Only a few presidents have ever taken on this “supreme law of the land” and decided to extract costs from the politically influential few for the good of the many – Teddy Roosevelt as he sought to bust the trusts; FDR as he re-wrote the social contract. Most other presidents have tried to have it both ways – to give the politically influential few what they want while also attempting to achieve some common good. This has often been the source of their failure. The populist scapegoating is an entirely different matter – and is generally fleeting and while distasteful does little real damage. 

Both of these have been part of American capitalism since the beginning. Yet for some reason, Samuelson believes that capitalism is more under siege today than in the past. He never makes the case why – except to point to distasteful and inefficient aspects of American capitalism that have been around since it’s inception. This is little reason to believe that either populist scapegoating or actions with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs have increased significantly. And Samuelson does not try to make that case. Rather, he reveals the same unease that the rest of “the Establishment” has with any significant change. 

The incoherence and of this worldview is clear. What is less obvious is why. The answer is a theme I have been coming to again and again in this blog: that the free market is not a natural phenomonen, but a creation of a society and government. Thus – we did not really “[subordinate] unrestrained profit-seeking to other values” as Samuelson suggests – rather the government created costs to balance the marketplace. If a company was polluting, it was damaging those around it just as much as if it had been stealing from them. By imposing costs, the government was not so much “subordinating unrestrained profit-seeking” to some other values – but preventing one party from stealing from another. So, the government enacted regulations to reduce that pollution – and exacted costs if companies did not follow those limits. The cap-and-trade legislation promises to be an even clearer interjection of the government in this manner. The government and the society of which the government is a part together create the circumstances in which a market can truly be free.

Capitalism – alone, without a society to provide a marketplace – is a meaningless concept. Pairing a capitalist economic model with a democratic state has become a long-term successful model for progress because the “seeds of destruction” that capitalism produces are mitigated and sometimes used by the democratic state to the confer legitimacy on the model. The problem with capitalism has proved to be not as much the “instability, unemployment, inequality” that Samuelson describes – but the concentration of power among a monied and politically-influential elite that has attempted to protect the status quo and their own interests at the expense of the legitimacy of capitalism itself. Once the concentration of power reaches a certain tipping point, the market becomes less free. Which is why the government must, from time to time, step in to allow some sort of balancing to take place and to create rules for the market which allow it to operate freely.

Samuelson is concerned that this means that Washington may take it upon itself to “permantly run the market.” In this he demonstrates his lack of understanding. The government – and the society at large – have always created the rules by which the market is run – have always sought to mitigate the damage wrought by robust competition and worse. What is different now is that once again the government failed to adequately police the market. Or alternately, you could argue that the government failed to ensure the market stayed free, allowing firms to become so big and powerful they posed a systematic risk. Either way, while it would be dangerous to have a government declaring it would “run the economy” – that is not the situation we are now facing. Samuelson’s unease seems more the result of a desire to protect the status quo than any real regard for or understanding of capitalism and free markets.

Categories
Economics Financial Crisis Foreign Policy Politics

Stimulus and Stability (cont.)

Nicholas Kulish in The New York Times explains how “Europe, Aided by Safety Nets, Resists U.S. Stimulus Push.” 

I wrote a few weeks ago that:

…there seems to be some sort of inverse relationship between a society’s social safety net and the amount of stimulus spending they are proposing. 

This makes sense on a number of levels. Automatic stabilizers which should take some of the pressure off a need for a stimulus are not included here. On another level, these nations without a strong safety net must rely more heavily on economic growth for societal stability. 

If this is true, China and America would be more reliant on constant economic growth to relieve social and political pressure and would be more likely to have larger stimulus packages. France and Germany with stronger safety nets would feel more insulated and be less likely to push for large stimulus packages. This is exactly how this matter is playing out on the world stage today – with some exceptions due to political leadership. 

But both states with strong social safety nets and those without them are dependent on growth over time. But those states without strong safety nets feel the economic bumps more strongly – and downturns end up being more disruptive.

Kulish writes now that:

The Europeans say they have no need for further stimulus right now because their social safety nets, derided in good times by free market disciples as sclerotic impediments to growth, are automatically providing the spending programs that the United States Congress has to legislate…

Mr. Posen and others argue that while Germany may be doing more stimulus spending than others in Europe, it is counseling other European countries — many of which share the euro as their common currency — not to spend their way out of recession either, but to count on their safety nets to do much of the job.

Nothing groundbreaking on either of our parts – but it’s an example of how fundamental societal agreements – the social bargains underpinning the state – affect everyday policy.

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Economics

The Dollar As a Negotiated Currency

Daniel Drezner:

If [an international reserve currency] does happen, however, the United States will suffer a serious loss of standing and, oh yes, a much harder budget constraint.  And whatever happens, it would be difficult to call the dollar a top currency anymore.  I think we have clearly crossed some threshhold where the dollar is now a negotiated currency – and some of the negotiating partners are pretty hostile to U.S. hegemony. 

I don’t know enough about the relationship between reserve currencies, account deficits, government, and power – but I know enough to know that this would likely be a huge blow to America’s hegemony. The dollar’s privileged status is a major part of what allows us to finance our military and our debt. Drezner points out how unlikely it is that the dollar will be replaced – but with these high-level comments by the Russians and the Chinese, coupled with the fundamental uncertainty about the dollar going forward, and the increasing nonpolarity of world power, it suggests that the dollar may be losing it’s privileged status. It will not necessarily be overtaken by an international reserve currency for the reasons Drezner states, but it has become – at least in this moment of our weakness – a negotiated currency.

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Conservativism Economics Financial Crisis Political Philosophy Politics The Opinionsphere

The Only Credible Response to Globalization

Niall Ferguson in The Telegraph:

Underlying this tremendous growth in financial markets was a fourfold liberalisation of international markets for goods, services, capital and labour. This was not, of course, peculiar to the English-speaking world: globalisation, as its name suggests, is ubiquitous. But its implications for those on the Anglophone Right were distinctive. Unremarked by conservatives in Britain, America and even Australia, these great shifts created a new and much greater trilemma.

Suppose that a government can have any two of the following things, but not all three: globalisation, in the sense of openness to international flows of goods, services, capital and labour; social stability; and a small state. Or, to put it differently, conservatives can pick any two from an open economy, a stable society and political power – but not all three.

Ferguson is extremely articulate (and credible) in his explanation of why conservatives have no “articulate” answers to globalization. He believes that conservatism will be able to once again thrive once it chooses to sacrifice social stability, which he links to social mobility. Although the two concepts certainly are related, it’s hard for me to accept the re-branding of one as the other – and it seems a bit too pat on Ferguson’s part. On the other hand, Ferguson describes the other side of the argument:

Only the Left appears to have a credible response [so far]: globalisation, plus social stability, plus a strong, interventionist state.

The set-up Ferguson proposes then would be:

The Left

In favor of:

  • Globalization
  • Social stability
  • Strong, interventionist state

Accepting as necessary evils:

  • Government interference
  • Less social mobility

Conservatives

In favor of:

  • Globalization
  • Social mobility
  • Small (but “smart”) state

Accepting as necessary evils:

  • Inequality
  • Booms and busts of the financial cycle
  • Social disorder

Ferguson avoids all the tough questions – such as what “smart” means – and how this would relate to regulation – and just presumes that governmental actions, inequality and social mobility are directly related – and that somehow, more inequality leads to more social mobility. I think perhaps Ferguson is attempting to create a scenario when he can plausibly oppose the man he describes as “the most Left-wing Democrat ever elected to be President of the United States.” This seems to me to be a rather implausible description of the pragmatist that Obama is. But this points to what is distorting Ferguson’s extremely interesting and insightful view of political ideologies and the current world trends. 

Let me propose an alternate party – one that it seems Barack Obama is already leading:

Liberals

In favor of:

  • Globalization
  • A strong, interventionist state to aid in the creation of and to police the market
  • A state that balances the need for a social safety net and individual incentives
  • A balance between social stability and social mobility

Accepting as necessary evils:

  • Inequality (but not extreme inequality)
  • Government interference
  • A level of social disorder
  • The boom-and-bust financial cycle (but mitigated)

The idea is to maximize certain goods while balancing against the evils that are their side effects. Extreme inequality can decrease social mobility at least as much as government distortions. A social safety net of the right type can act both a great equalizer and as an incentive for individuals to pursue their entrepreneurial ambitions. 

My problem with Ferguson’s critique is that he seems to view the debate between the Left and conservatives as an either/or proposition – which it often is – but given the situation he describes, it’s more an argument of degree rather than kind. The Left that Ferguson is arguing against may favor social equality over social mobility but both sides agree that both goals are worthy. It’s a question of what the right balance is.

Categories
Financial Crisis Politics Scandal-mongering

Eliot Spitzer’s Comeback

In the past few weeks, Eliot Spitzer has been all around us. His Slate columns have become a must-read. He was against AIG before it was cool. He was railing against the excesses of Wall Street while everyone else was enjoying the fake boom. 

If it were not for the scandal that forced him to resign, this would have been Eliot Spitzer’s time. Vice Presidential buzz would be growing; he would be one of the go-to guys that Obama would call to give him cover as he dealt with Wall Street. It is based on this that David Rothkopf at Foreign Policy listed Spitzer as one of the “losers of the week” saying that:

[T]he A.I.G. scandal and the collapse of Wall Street could have been [Spitzer’s] apotheosis, the moment the howling dogs of ambition in his breast might have finally gotten enough red meat of press exposure.

But despite his current disgraced status – and no doubt in part because of it – he has been able to talk more candidly about the “real scandal” of the AIG bailout: that it “has been a way to hide an enormous second round of cash to the same group that had received TARP money already.”

This sets up Spitzer to now say, “sunlight is the best disinfectant“! Ironic for a man brought down by too much sunlight.

I’m going to repeat what I said before – as the conventional wisdom states that the only things that can truly destroy a political career are “a dead woman or a live boy,” Spitzer will be back. Given the magnitude of this scandal, he may be back sooner than we expect. Interviewed on The Brian Lehrer Show last week, his politic answer on whether he is planning to make a comeback as a media person made it clear he is still intent on winning back the public’s good graces.

His understated and calculated public appearances are not consistent with a man looking to become a media personality – he would want more appearances and try to adopt a more strident tone if this was his goal; they are not consistent with a man who is done with politics – as he does not have the gravitas and devil-may-care honestly and looseness that comes with this life decision; instead, he seems to be staging a comeback. He waited just over a year from his resignation before giving his first interview – despite the increasingly clear Wall Street scandal that he had been brewing. He’s focusing on policy, substance, and seriousness to avoid as much as possible talking about his past scandals. But his answer still have the slipperiness of a pol.

It’s only a matter of time before he runs for office again.

Categories
Economics Financial Crisis History Politics

The Reagan Revolution (cont.)

[digg-reddit-me]Some objections have been raised to my two posts on the Reagan Revolution earlier this week (here and here) that stem from a misunderstanding of what I was trying to say – a misunderstanding perhaps based on what I chose to emphasize when telling the story of the 1980s revolutions.

So let me re-tell the story briefly.

Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a man who met his moment. The nation was reacting to the excesses of the New Deal and Great Society liberalism and the 1960s revolutions – and they wanted a return to an older time. The country was in a reactionary mood, but still looking for optimism after the glum and depressing honesty of Jimmy Carter. Reagan blended the two in his own distinctive way. At the same time, the conservative movement that had been launched with Senator Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign was finally reaching maturity. The infrastructure of think tanks, foundations, magazines, and other organizations that the Scaife family and the Coors family and the Koch family and later the Walton family and others had started to build in 1964 was generating new and innovative right-leaning ideas. The neoliberal philosophy that Reagan was sympathetic to still only had a small number of adherents, but thanks to the conservative infrastructure it had reach and with marketing savvy was sold. At the same time, wealth was already becoming more heavily concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people, giving the rich benefactors of the conservative movement more power.

In this moment, Reagan became president – with liberalism tired and worn out, with a reaction against it’s excesses and the excesses of the revolutions of the 1960s reaching a boiling point, and a conservative movement heavily influenced at the top levels by neoliberalism finally maturing. Thus was launched the Reagan Revolution. 

This revolution wasn’t really about Reagan – but he was the figurehead at the top. A lot of the revolutionary changes had to do with society’s changing mores that allowed, “Greed is good” to became a positive mantra echoing the neoliberal Ayn Rand’s talk of the “virtue of selfishness.” Some of it had to do with the growing influence of the extremely wealthy. Some of it was a reaction against the silliness of the anti-materialism of the hippie generation. But like the 1960s revolutions, which were enabled though not created by the government, likewise for the 1980s revolutions. Reagan’s constant stimulus spending supercharged the economy; his trimming back the social safety net, his tax cuts for the wealthy, and his spending increases accelerated the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of fewer and fewer. His acquiescence to the informal Bretton Woods II arrangement created an economy that “favored finance over domestic manufacturing.” His trimming back of regulations also accelerated this trend. To some degree, these changes had positive effects – as the market was freer, as the economy grew, as corporations thrived, as the overall wealth of America grew. 

But they spelled trouble down the road. The stimulus spending and tax cutting, the informal Bretton Woods II agreement, and concentration of wealth created an unstable system. Internally, the society was imbalanced as extremes of wealth and power were accumulated by a small minority. This eventually undermined the very free market and democratic discourse that is essential to the American tradition. A course correction later might have saved the Reagan vision – and for a time it seemed as if Bill Clinton’s moderate presidency had, as middle class wages finally began to grow again – but Bush doubled down on Reaganism when he should have pared back, and we are left with this mess.

Is this collapse Reagan’s fault? I wouldn’t say so. But he set the initial course towards this iceberg, even if the iceberg was out of sight at the time he set the course. He – and the 1980s revolutions in finance, economics, and government that his administration supported and enabled – are the true authors of this economic collapse, even if they cannot be blamed for not forseeing it.

Categories
Economics Financial Crisis Humor Politics Videos

The Real Scandal of AIG

[digg-reddit-me]Eliot Spitzer, in what is becoming a must-read column for Slate, gets to the nub of the real scandal of AIG:

The AIG bailout has been a way to hide an enormous second round of cash to the same group that had received TARP money already.

As I’ve quoted former Governor William Weld before:

There’s no one so brave and wise as the politician who’s not running for office and who’s not going to be…

Yet it is almost as likely that former Governor Eliot Spitzer is following an alternate path that seems similar but has a different conclusion. Let me propose a corollary to Weld’s statement:

A bit braver and a little less wise than the politician who’s not running for office and who’s not going to be is the chastened politician who seeks redemption in the form of speaking truth to power from his exile until he has established his moral bona fides enough to be allowed back in.

A bit less snappy though. Meanwhile, Jay Leno has his own suggestion for how to deal with the AIG bonus issue (the one that Spitzer points out is a side issue):

You have to appreciate the subtle balance Jay manages here – and the craft and delicate political sensibility that goes into a joke like this. Aiming for a mass audience, he can’t offend either Democrats or Republicans. Yet a political joke that is offensive to no one just isn’t funny. So Jay manages to cram two alternate jokes into one – with one interpretation for Democrats and the other for Republicans, and a certain cognitive dissonance allowing both interpretations.

On a superficial level, Leno is chastising the Obama administration and saying that it should emulate the Bush administration. 

But he undermines this suggestion by invoking as a fact – which it is, even if the mainstream media does not often acknowledge it – the lawlessness of the Bush administration – and perhaps even mocking their oft-used Jack Bauer defense.

Yet on another level, what he is proposing – that Obama just forget the law and go after AIG – has a certain elemental satisfaction to it – and would probably be a popular move. There would be a catharsis there, instead of the interminable responsibility of the Obama administration. 

As I mentioned above – there is a certain craft to this. Often, Leno’s monologues are seen as without edge but when they work, they allow multiple edges such as this joke does. 

As a side note to all of this – once something becomes the premise of a joke by Jay Leno, you know it has been popularly accepted as true – or true enough. The fact that the premise of this joke was Bush administration lawlessness is pretty significant in that regard.

Categories
China Economics Financial Crisis History

The Reagan Revolution (cont.)

[digg-reddit-me]I’ve gotten a bit of feedback/blowback about having simplified what went on the in 1980s that led to the indisputable higher levels of income disparity, the concentration of wealth, the decimation of manufacturing, and the rise of finance. This wasn’t about Ronald Reagan and his neoliberal policies – it is claimed – but about basic economic forces. I tried to take that into account by pointing out that Reagan was only accelerating the trends that started in the 1970s – but let me go further now.

Another major factor that aided these trends was not entirely within Reagan’s control. As John Judis explained in The New Republic, in the 1980s:

…Japan was threatened by a cheaper dollar. To keep exports high, Japan intentionally held down the yen’s value by carefully controlling the disposition of the dollars it reaped from its trade surplus with the United States. Instead of using these to purchase goods or to invest in the Japanese economy or to exchange for yen, it began to recycle them back to the United States by purchasing companies, real estate, and, above all, Treasury debt…

With Japan’s purchases, the United States would not have to keep interest rates high in order to attract buyers to Treasury securities, and it wouldn’t have to raise taxes in order to reduce the deficit…[That] informal bargain…became the cornerstone of a new international economic arrangement…

Judis goes on to explain how this arrangement evolved through the 1990s:

Asian countries, led by China, adopted a version of Japan’s strategy for export-led growth… They maintained trade surpluses with the United States; and, instead of exchanging their dollars for their own currencies or investing them internally, they, like the Japanese, recycled them into T-bills and other dollar-denominated assets. This kept the value of their currencies low in relation to the dollar and perpetuated the trade surplus by which they acquired the dollars in the first place…

Until recently, there have been clear upsides to this bargain for the United States: the avoidance of tax increases, growing wealth at the top of the income ladder, and preservation of the dollar as the international currency…

[The current financial system] is sustained by specific national policies. The United States has acquiesced in large trade deficits – and their effect on the U.S. workforce – in exchange for foreign funding of our budget deficits. And Asia has accepted a lower standard of living in exchange for export-led growth and a lower risk of currency crises.

This financial arrangment was not created by Ronald Reagan – but he did acquiese to it – and spent America into a level of indebtedness it had not been in since World War II. This arrangment would not be consistent with a ideological neoliberalism that was discussed before – but this arrangment, most importantly, did benefit many of those who were vocal proponents of neoliberalism. 

The revolutions of the 1980s then, was not merely the result of a political movement within America – not anymore than the revolutions of the 1960s were. There were international factors that helped along both domestic movements. The combination of this special relationship with Japan – and later China and other Asian countries – with the neoliberal revolution of Ronald Reagan – led to a concentration of wealth and power within a small class of people rarely seen in a developed country. As Paul Krugman observed:

It’s important to know that no other advanced economy has seen a comparable surge in inequality – even the rising inequality of Thatcherite Britain was a faint echo of trends here.

Combined with the neoliberal principle, as described by Stanley Fish, that “Short-term transactions-for-profit [are better than] long-term planning designed to produce a more just and equitable society,” it becomes more clear how we ended up in this enormous financial mess. 

Take away the regulations; encourage short-term profits; reduce taxes; trim the social safety net; “starve the beast” by spending without taxing; and then supercharge the economy with constant stimulus spending (which is what “starve the beast” is) and easy debt from China and Japan. What you get from this is not only a revolution that undermines the American way of life in the mid-term – as wealth is concentrated and middle class and manufacturing jobs dry up – but an unsustainable economy that is going to collapse, and collapse hard. 

In other words, you get what we have now.

Today, we are reaping the effects of the generational bargain at the heart of the Reagan presidency.